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David-Hillel Ruben’s ‘Traditions and True Successors’: A Critical Reply 
John Williams, Singapore Management University 
 
In 1988 I became interested in the relationship between the ideas of Confucius and those 
of Mencius. I noticed that what appeared in one form or other in discussions of this 
relationship was the unelucidated notion of ‘true succession’.1   
 
The relation has some interesting features. Nietzsche probably had no true successor and 
Wittgenstein was not his own true successor. Although Marx was a true successor of 
Hegel and Lenin was a true successor of Marx, Lenin was not a true successor of Hegel. 
Thus true succession is not transitive. Zeno was a true successor of Pythagoras, but so too 
was Parmenides. Thus true succession is a one-to-many relation. 
 
In Williams 1988 I argued that Mencius was not a true successor of Confucius. One 
argument I opposed is that the Ta Hsửeh (the authorship of which is obscure) and the 
Chung Yung are reliable expressions of the ideas of Confucius and since Mencius was a 
true successor of the author of these two works, it follows that Mencius was a true 
successor of Confucius (Lu 1983, 81). I observed that this argument is invalid because 
true succession is non-transitive (Williams 1988, 161). I also proposed an analysis of the 
relation that I thought would explain this, namely 
 
An individual B is a true successor of an individual A if and only if  
 
(1) The central ideas of B were developed after those of A.  
 
(2) The central ideas of A are consistent with those of B.  
 
(3) B understood the ideas of A.  
 
(4) A would, ceteris paribus, have developed more or less the same central 
ideas as those actually developed by B.  
 
(5) The central ideas of A are not identical with those of B.  
 
In support of (2) I claimed that the late Wittgenstein is no true successor of the early 
because the Wittgenstein of the Investigations could not have consistently held on to a 
tractarian theory of language. In support of (3) I claimed that, in some sense, the 
successor is influenced by the predecessor. I assumed that the successor’s ideas could not 
have been influenced by those of the predecessor unless the successor understood them. 
In support of (4) I argued that Plato could not have been a true successor of Socrates 
unless his ideas were an advancement of those of Socrates. I took (4) to express this 
claim. In support of (5) I claimed that if the central ideas of A and B were identical we 
would say that at worst one was guilty of plagiarism and that at best, by a rare 
                                                
1 Chang 1964, 298; Cheng 1974, 8; Cohen 1975, 160-161, 166; Cua 1984 234; Fu 1973 375, 378-379, 382; 
Hwang 1980, 49; Lai 1984, 55; Lau 1970, 44; Lu 1983, 79. 
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coincidence, independent minds had arrived at the same view. This would rule out true 
succession, since an integral idea in true succession is that, in some sense, the successor 
is influenced by the predecessor. 
  
I then argued that no relation is transitive if the necessary conditions for it to obtain are 
that some further relation obtains which is itself not transitive. But (2)-(5) are in terms of 
the relations of consistency, understanding, and non-identity, none of which are transitive. 
Moreover (4) requires the satisfaction of a conditional that is counterfactual and is thus 
non-transitive.2 
 
David Ruben (2013) gives an analysis of true succession and of tradition. This enables 
him to diagnose the intractability typically found in disputes in which two groups each 
claim that it, but not its rival, is in the tradition of some earlier group. What is the source 
of the dispute? One answer is in terms of ambiguity. Each party means different things by 
the denotation of the tradition. For example the Shia and the Sunni mean different things 
by ‘Islam’. Then the dispute may be resolved by distinguishing two concepts, say Islam 1 
and Islam 2. Ruben observes that this explanation is implausible because it fails to 
account for the strength of the social struggle (34). The parties to the dispute appear to 
have more at stake than labels and the importance they attach to them. 
 
Another explanation in terms of vagueness is that the disputants (such as the Sunni and 
the Shia) might share a single unambiguous concept of the tradition (say, ‘Islam’) that 
embeds vague terms (such as ‘legitimate successor of the Prophet’) variously interpreted 
(such as ‘an elected successor’ and ‘a successor appointed by the Prophet’) leading to 
varying so-called conceptions (of Islam), while preserving the unambiguity of the core 
concept (of Islam). 
 
Ruben objects that when different a priori conceptions, C1 and C2, are added to an 
univocal concept X, ambiguity results in the form of two different concepts, XC1 and 
XC2 (35). Ruben is correct, because if someone has the concept of C1 (say, because she 
has no concept of election) but not C2 (say, because she has no concept of appointment) 
while someone else has the concept of C2 but not C1, then they have different concepts 
of X (in this case, Islam). 
 
He then returns to the concept of true succession, which concerns the beliefs and 
practices of individuals. In contrast I talked of their ‘ideas’, a term I took to encompass 
not only beliefs but also aims, theories and explanations, but not practices. Ruben finds 
                                                
2 In other words, none of the following need be true. 
 
If p is consistent with q and q is consistent with r, then p is consistent with r.  
If A understands the central ideas of B and B understands the central ideas of C, then A understands the 
central ideas of C.  
If A is non-identical to B and B is non-identical to C then A is non-identical to C. 
Given that were the case that p then it would be the case that q and were the case the q then it would be the 
case that r, then were the case that p then it would be the case that r.  
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my analysis, which is forward-looking in virtue of (4), to be problematic. A 
counterfactual is true just in case the closest worlds to the actual world in which the 
antecedent is true are those in which the consequent is true. So (4) is true just in case the 
closest worlds to the actual world (in which B is alive with his present ideas) in which A 
has lived to the present are those in which A has developed more or less the same central 
ideas as those that B has developed. Ruben objects that whether A has developed these 
ideas depends upon which of his other ideas we hold fixed from when he was alive. But 
there are many different and incompatible ways in which we may fix these, with the 
result that it is indeterminate whether (4) is true (38).  
 
I am unsure whether this is a good objection. To determine whether (4) is true we 
imagine a world in which A has lived until the time at which B is alive that is as similar 
as logic allows to the actual world at that time. What we hold fixed in this imaginary 
world is the history of the development of A’s ideas at the time of his death. If, in that 
world, A has developed more or less the same central ideas as those that B has developed, 
then (4) is true, otherwise it is false. I admit however that there seems to be no clear way 
in which we can decide whether in this imaginary world, A has developed more or less 
the same central ideas as those that B has developed. In this respect the backward-looking 
analysis Ruben proposes, that  
 
B is a true successor of A if and only if  
 
(6) B’s central beliefs and practices came after those of A and to the extent 
that  
 
(7) B’s central beliefs and practices are qualitatively similar to those of A 
(37-38) 
 
is less problematic, since (7) is much easier to decide and is certainly a necessary 
condition. Moreover it now seems to me that (4) is not an expression of the claim that B’s 
central ideas are an advancement over those of A, and since it is that claim I wished to 
express, I should have just made it a condition of true succession with no mention of (4).   
 
Likewise what now seems important to me for my analysis is not (3) but that in some 
sense, the successor is influenced by the predecessor. Ruben disagrees, claiming that ‘It is 
not implausible to hold that a later thinker, for example, might be the true successor 
intellectually to the ideas of an earlier thinker, even if the later thinker had never heard of 
or been in any way influenced by the earlier one’ (38). Although ‘true succession’ might 
be more of a term of art than ‘tradition’, I think that this ignores the fact that in some way 
the successor owes something valuable to her predecessor. This is reflected in the way 
that Ruben properly takes a ‘true successor’ to be synonymous with a ‘faithful successor’. 
In one sense of ‘true’ I remain true to my wife insofar as I remain faithful to her. 
Likewise I remain true to the aims and central beliefs of socialism insofar as I continue to 
embrace them. But I cannot continue to embrace them if I have never heard of them.  
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Moreover, unlike ‘tradition’, ‘true successor’ is a term of praise. Even if one does not 
endorse the value of the ideas of a particular thinker, to say that someone is her true 
successor or is faithful to her ideas is to say something praiseworthy of the successor. It is 
also to say that the successor owes something to her predecessor. In this respect true 
succession is like the succession of the monarchs of England, as when we judge that 
George II but not James Francis Edward Stuart (‘The Old Pretender’) was the true 
successor of George I. Being faithful also explains the need for (2). I cannot remain true 
to the aims and central beliefs of socialism insofar as my own ideas are radically 
inconsistent with them. 
 
I now see that the reason I gave for the non-transitivity of true succession was mistaken, 
since it is false that no relation is transitive if the necessary conditions for it to obtain are 
that some further relation obtains which is itself not transitive. For ‘larger than’ is 
transitive but X is larger than Y only if X is not the same size as Y and ‘not the same size 
as’ is non-transitive. Ruben gives a better explanation; true succession is a non-transitive 
and one-to-many relation because so is similarity. A’s ideas may be qualitatively similar 
to B’s and B’s may be qualitatively similar to C’s, without A’s being qualitatively similar 
to C’s.  Or A’s ideas may be qualitatively similar to both those of B and C, even to the 
same degree, although in different ways (39). 
 
Ruben now turns to the concept of a tradition, which may be intellectual or practical, or 
an amalgam, although each involves the beliefs and practices of groups. He does not 
attempt to define ‘tradition’, but notes that it must last long enough, although how long is 
inescapably vague (40). He observes that one tradition may be ‘nested’ within another, as 
Catholicism is nested within Christianity and that it may have a ‘gappy’ existence, dying 
out and then being revived (42). Ruben also claims that when traditions start to exist is 
vague (42). This is certainly so in many cases, yet there are exceptions. The practical 
tradition that the first pitch of the USA baseball be thrown by the President originated 
with Williams Howard Taft on April 14, 1910.3  One might see the origin of the Christian 
intellectual tradition as the first acquisition of the beliefs and practices of Jesus by his 
disciples.  
 
Ruben then proposes that  
 
Group B is in the same tradition of those of Group A if and only if  
 
(8) The central beliefs and practices of A influenced those of B. 
 
(9) The central beliefs and practices of B are qualitatively similar to those 
of A (44). 
 
                                                
3 As another example, Queen Victoria originated the practical tradition of wearing a bridal gown in white 
by wearing one herself at her wedding in 1840 (Ingraham 2008: 60–61). 
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Vagueness may now be seen as part of the source of disputes over which group belongs 
to a tradition. If group B but not its rival C belongs to the tradition of A, then the central 
beliefs and practices of B are much more qualitatively similar to those of A. But how 
beliefs and practices are to be individuated and counted is vague (44). Moreover B and C 
may irresolvably disagree over which beliefs and practices are central to A (44). 
Furthermore a significant portion of the beliefs and practices of both B and C might be 
qualitatively similar to those of A, but a significant portion of C’s are qualitatively 
dissimilar to those of A. B and C may irresolvably disagree over whether this 
dissimilarity disqualifies C from being in the same tradition as A (44). The problem 
becomes more acute if each of B and C sets the limits of permissible variation for itself, 
so that the criteria for membership becomes internal (44) and even more so if the criteria 
are disputed and prone to change (44). Likewise if B but not its rival C belongs to the 
tradition of A, then this may be because the beliefs and practices of A influenced those of 
B much more than those of C. But the degree of influence on B that A needs as well as 
how much is ‘much more’ is vague.   
 
I think that this way of identifying the source of dispute is insightful. But I also think that 
a true successor must ‘go beyond’ the predecessor’s central ideas in developing original 
ones central to the successor that are at least largely consistent with those of the 
predecessor while preserving a core of qualitative similarity between them. This is what 
makes a true successor praiseworthy. Consistency and similarity are independent 
requirements, because two thinkers may share a common core of ideas, each of which 
they hold central, while each also holding central another set of ideas that are inconsistent 
with each other.  In contrast, a school of thought may, but need not, go beyond the 
tradition to which it belongs. A group of disciples of an earlier movement may replicate 
its central ideas faithfully, neither discarding nor adding to them. This group would 
certainly belong to the tradition of the earlier movement.  
 
Given my discussion so far, I am inclined to propose the following. 
 
An individual B is a true intellectual successor of an individual A if and only if  
 
B’s central ideas were developed after those of A and the central ideas of 
B are largely consistent with those of A, largely similar to them, yet a 




Group B is in the same intellectual tradition as Group A if and only if  
 
B’s central ideas were developed after those of A and the central ideas of B are 
largely consistent with those of A and largely similar to them, because they were 
influenced by them. 
 
This analysis explains why the Sunni do not belong to the tradition of the Shia, since they 
hold inconsistent beliefs about the legitimate successor of the Prophet. 
Williams, John. 2013. “David-Hillel Ruben’s ‘Traditions and True Successors’: A Critical Reply.”  




This gives us a way of relating true succession to a school of thought’s membership of a 
tradition. One case is when there is a tradition of following the ideas of its founder. Then 
a true successor of that founder emerges and a new tradition evolves that follows the 
ideas of the true successor, with the result that the new tradition belongs to the older one, 
yet goes beyond it.   
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